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We present for the first time, a bidirectional Quantum Key Distribution protocol with minimal
encoding operations derived from the use of two ‘nonorthogonal’ unitary transformations selected
from two mutually unbiased unitary bases; which are indistinguishable in principle for a single use.
Along with its decoding procedure, it is a stark contrast to its ‘orthogonal encoding’ predecessors.
Defining a more relevant notion of security threshold for such protocols, the current protocol outper-
forms its predecessor in terms of security as the maximal amount of information an eavesdropper can
glean is essentially limited by the indistinguishability of the transformations. We further propose
adaptations for a practical scenario and report on a proof of concept experimental scheme based on
polarised photons from an attenuated pulsed laser for qubits, demonstrating the feasibility of such
a protocol.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum cryptography, or more specifically quantum
key distribution (QKD) provides for a solution to the
courier problem of distributing secret keys between two
parties to be utilised for a one-time pad cryptographic
protocol. Arguably a first rather direct practical appli-
cation of quantum physics, with realisations mainly in
terms of optical based implementations, QKD’s security
is guaranteed by physical laws and saw its debut in the
famous BB84 [1] protocol, where one party, commonly
referred to as Alice would send a photon prepared in
one of two bases (mutually unbiased) over a quantum
channel to another, Bob, for his measurements to deter-
mine the state sent. This is a straightforward scenario
of ‘prepare and measure’; i.e. Alice prepares a quantum
state while Bob measures. An adversary, Eve, would not
be able to determine the states sent without inducing
any errors. In general, channels are noisy and detection
alone in any QKD protocol would prove to be impracti-
cal. More importantly, an estimation of the amount of
information Eve may have gleaned can be inferred from
the error between Alice and Bob and thus, below a pre-
scribed threshold, a secret key can nevertheless be dis-
tilled by the legitimate parties. This is done by first
correcting any errors between them using error correc-
tions (EC) codes and Eve’s knowledge of the key can be
reduced to arbitrarily low levels using privacy amplifi-
cation (PA) procedures (we refer to [2, 3] for excellent
reviews on quantum cryptography).
While variants of the first QKD protocol has seen much
development, a departure from a prepare and measure
scenario was imagined in a QKD protocol making bidi-
rectional use of the quantum channel between Alice and
Bob, sometimes referred to as two-way QKD (we shall use
the terms bidirectional and two-way interchangeably). It
was first reported in 2003 in [4] and later saw its evolu-
tion into various forms, improving on security and some
on practicality [5–7]. The essential feature of the proto-
col is the encoding of information by one party, Alice,
by executing unitary transformations on qubits received
from (and prepared by) another party, Bob who would
later measure it in the same basis he prepared it in. In-
formation bits for secret key generation is derived from
the different transformations, in clear contrast to BB84
like schemes where information for the same purpose is
simply the state themselves. Hence, while the latter re-
quires an eavesdropper to estimate the state of a traveling
qubit between the legitimate parties for successful eaves-
dropping, two-way protocols challenge eavesdroppers to
estimate the evolution of an unknown state as it travels
to and fro between Alice and Bob. Practical implementa-
tions realised include those reported in [8] with entangled
photons, [9, 10] with weak (attenuated) pulsed laser as
photon sources and even using telecommunication wave-
lengths in [11] to cite a few.
However, in all these, the unitary transformations had
mostly been limited to those that may be described by
the Pauli matrices, X,Y, Z plus the identity operator I
(in most cases, it would be the iY and the identity I)
and the security of the protocols mainly lie in the inabil-
ity to determine conclusively the traveling qubits’ states
randomly prepared by Bob in one of two mutually unbi-
ased basis (MUB). Bob himself obviously can distinguish
between the transformations; in principle, these unitary
transformations can be distinguished perfectly even for
a single use [12]. Ref.[13] referred to these transforma-
tions as a set of orthogonal unitaries. While this on its
own does not hinder an eavesdropper (Eve) to ascertain
without ambiguity the transformations executed by Al-
ice, it does result in the former introducing errors should
measurements be made instead on the received states.
To this effect the legitimate party would, randomly in-
terlude their encoding/ decoding runs with prepare and
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2measure runs where Bob’s prepared states are, with a
certain probability, measured by Alice, akin to a BB84
scenario and is referred to as the control mode (CM).
The encoding/ decoding runs are denoted as the encod-
ing mode (EM).
While being operational and secure, these protocols in
some sense betray the essence of utilising physical laws
directly affecting Eve’s ability to eavesdropping the en-
codings. As prepare and measure schemes delivers by
capitalising on imperfect state estimations, these two-
way schemes unfortunately do not, in an analogous way,
prescribe imperfect estimation of unitary transformation
as part of its working engine. The idea of Alice actu-
ally using transformations which are in principle indistin-
guishable for a single use for encoding purpose was noted
in [14] where the unitaries would be selected randomly
from two mutually unbiased bases of orthogonal qubit
unitaries (a term used in [13]). A study, more focused
towards QKD for such two-way protocols using qubits se-
lected from 2 MUBs encoded with such indistinguishable
‘nonorthogonal unitaries’ was reported in [15]. The term
nonorthogonal unitaries can be traced to Ref. [16] and
the relevant definition was later given in [15]. A proper
formalization for the structure of such unitaries was stud-
ied as mutually unbiased unitary bases (MUUB) in [17].
In short, two orthogonal bases, B0 and B1, for some n-
dimensional subspace of 2×2 matrices are defined as sets
of MUUB when∣∣∣Tr(Bi†0 Bj1)∣∣∣2 = C , ∀Bi0 ∈ B0, Bj1 ∈ B1, (1)
for i, j,= 1, . . . , n and some constant C 6= 0; C equals 1
and 2 for n = 4 and n = 2 respectively [17].
In this work, we describe and analyse a bidirectional
QKD protocol which uses a minimal number of indistin-
guishable unitary for encodings where each encoding is
selected from two different MUUB. Given the use of only
2 unitary operators, differently from [15] (which used 4)
as well as other two-way QKDs, the very decoding proce-
dure by Bob would be radically different from previously
reported two-way protocols. Beginning with an ideal pro-
tocol, we brief on its merits in a depolarising channel and
provide a security analysis which demonstrates its clear
advantage over its predecessor, the protocol of [7]. We
further report on an experimental proof of concept for
the protocol revealing its feasibility.
II. BIDIRECTIONAL QKD WITH TWO
MUTUALLY UNBIASED UNITARIES
The protocol is based on the same bidirectional use of
the quantum channel where Bob sends to Alice a qubit
prepared in a basis of his choice. Alice would then encode
using one of two unitary transformation before submit-
ting to Bob for his measurements. We consider the case
where Alice uses unitaries described as rotations around
the y axis of the Poincare sphere given respectively by
Ry(ζ) = cos
(
ζ
2
)
I− i sin
(
ζ
2
)
Y. (2)
We choose only two angles for ζ in this work, namely,
ζ = 0 (corresponding to a passive operation) and ζ =
−pi/2 which corresponds to flipping states between the
mutually unbiased orthonormal X and Z bases. The
transformations are in fact elements taken from either
of two sets of MUUB [15], {I, Y } and {Ry(±pi/2)} with
respect to one another,
|Tr(IRy(±pi/2))|2 =
∣∣Tr(Y †Ry(±pi/2))∣∣2 = 2. (3)
The indistinguishability of these two transformations can
be seen from the indistinguishability of an input state for
the transformation, from its output. With an arbitrary
state |ψ〉 = cos (θ/2)|0〉 + exp (iφ) sin (θ/2)|1〉, we can
quickly observe that the overlap
|〈ψ|IRy(−pi/2)|ψ〉|2 = 1
2
+
sin2 (θ) sin2 (φ)
2
(4)
has a minimum value of 1/2. This minimum value is in
fact the square of the inner product for two states coming
from two MUB.
Any state lying on the equator of the Poincare sphere
would hence provide for minimal overlap. Thus we let
Bob prepare a state randomly selected from the basis
defined by {|0q〉 = cos (θ/2)|0〉 + sin (θ/2)|1〉, |1q〉 =
sin (θ/2)|0〉 − cos (θ/2)|1〉} to be submitted to Alice for
her encoding (transformation). The value for the angle
θ is also a random choice by Bob.
Once Alice has executed her transformation, the result-
ing state would be forwarded to Bob for which he shall
commit to a measurement in either the same basis he pre-
pared or one rotated by pi/2. Writing Alice’s transforma-
tion as UA and Bob’s prepared and resulting measured
state as |ψf 〉 and |ψb〉 respectively, Bob can only deter-
mine Alice’s encoding conclusively if 〈ψb|UA|ψf 〉 = 0.1
As an example, if Bob prepares the computational state
|0〉 and his measurement result is |1〉, then he knows for
certain that Alice could not have used the I operation.
Or, if a measurement had been made in the X basis in-
stead and yields (|0〉+ |1〉)/√2, then Bob can infer that
Alice had not used Ry(−pi/2). Bob shall then announce
publicly all inconclusive results to be discarded. Assign-
ing the logical value ‘0’ to I and ‘1’ to Ry(−pi/2), Alice
and Bob can share a key only for 1/4 of the total qubits
used.
A. Security Analysis
Taking the conventional approach to security analysis
of bidirectional QKDs, we consider Eve’s strategy is to
1 admittedly, this is inspired very much by the SARG protocol [18]
3attack the qubits en route twice, once in the forward
path (from Bob to Alice) and once in the backward path
(from Alice back to Bob). In the individual paths, the
density operator for Bob’s qubit, ρB , on its own does not
provide for any information; a qubit prepared as either
of the orthogonal states in any basis in the forward path
is completely mixed as is the case in the backward path
after Alice’s encoding.
We shall analyse the protocol based on the methods
of [19, 20], where we shall consider each of Bob’s travel-
ing state to independently undergo identical interaction
with Eve’s ancilla prior to Alice’s encoding. Then we al-
low Eve to have access to the entire state in the backward
path (after encoding) to extract information and we set
no constraint on how she may do this. This is ultimately
a very pessimistic stand and provides for a collective at-
tack scenario.
We do however, reasonably require Eve’s strategy to
simulate a depolarising channel like [20], i.e. Bob’s qubit,
irrespective of the basis chosen should experience the
same amount of noise, essentially undergoing a symmet-
ric attack [2]. Also, like [20], we shall begin with Bob’s
state in one basis only, and then show that the informa-
tion Eve should gain for any of Bob’s choice of basis is
the same. We begin by writing the interaction between
Eve’s ancillae, |E〉, and the travelling qubit (in the com-
putational basis for simplicity) in the forward path as;
U |b〉|E〉 = |b〉|Ebb〉+ |b⊥〉|Ebb⊥〉 (5)
with b ∈ {0, 1} and 0¯ = 1 (1¯ = 0). Unitarity of the
interaction necessitates
〈Ebb¯|Ebb¯〉+ 〈Ebb|Ebb〉 = 1, 〈Ebb|Eb¯b〉+ 〈Ebb¯|Eb¯b¯〉 = 0 (6)
and we let 〈Ebb|Ebb〉 = F and 〈Ebb¯|Ebb¯〉 = Q and F+Q = 1.
It is also worth noting that, with proper choices for
phases, one can ensure all of Eve’s scalar products are
reals [2]. Now, the value Q is really the probability of
Bob’s state being measured as one orthogonal to which
he sent. Admittedly, in the current protocol, we have not
defined the protocol to measure the qubit in the forward
path, thus making Q inaccessible; it can easily be deter-
mined if we include some form of CM similar to that of
[7]. We shall return to this point later.
The state of the system (Bob’s qubit after Eve’s attack
in the forward path) subsequent to Alice’s encoding can
be written as
ρBE =
1
2
[
UρBU
† +REy (UρBU
†)RE†y
]
(7)
where ρB = I/2 ⊗ |E〉〈E| and REy = Ry(−pi/2) ⊗ IE
with IE being the identity on Eve’s Hilbert space. Eve
access to the state on the backward path provides her
with information of the key, IE , which is given by
S(ρBE) − 1 [20] where S(ρ) is the von Neuman en-
tropy given by −trρ log2 ρ for a state ρ, which writ-
ten in terms of its eigenvalues, λi, and eigenkets, then
S(ρ) = −∑i λi log2 λi.
In ascertaining the eigenvalues of ρBE , we adopt the
method in [20] by calculating the eigenvalues of its Gram
matrix representation, GBE [21]. The eigenvalues, for
GBE (which are equal to those of ρBE including its mul-
tiplicities, each being 2) are given by
λ± =
1
8
(2±
√
2(F cosx−Q cos y)2 + 2). (8)
Eve’s information gain, IE can then be written as
IE = S(ρBE)− 1 = h
(
2− a√2
4
)
(9)
with a =
√
(F cosx−Q cos y)2 + 1 and h(x) =
−x log2 x− (1−x) log2 (1− x) being the Shannon binary
entropic function.
Now, we should stress the fact that Eve’s informa-
tion gain is actually the same for any state Bob could
send (constrained to those on the equator of the Poincare
sphere) and thus this analysis is valid in considering the
protocol as described above where Bob can send any such
states. We demonstrate this fact briefly in the section on
Methods. Insisting on the same disturbance for any such
state sent by Bob, the value for Q = 1 − F would be
given by [2] 2 and we can eventually write
1− 2Q(1 + cos y) = F cosx−Q cos y. (10)
Hence, a =
√
[1− 2Q(1 + cos y)]2 + 1. We can immedi-
ately observe that Eve’s best strategy to maximise her
information would be to maximise cos y; ensuring Q be
kept minimal. Thus for a fixed Q, let cos y = 1 (which
then fixes x) and her information would be given by
IE = h
[
1
2
(
1−
√
(1− 4Q)2 + 1√
2
)]
. (11)
It’s evident that Eve achieves maximum information, ap-
proximately 0.6 when Q = 0.25 and is equal to the von
Neumann entropy for a mixture of two states derived
from two MUBs.
B. Security Thresholds
Unlike its prepare and measure cousins, the secret key
rate for two way protocols would depend on 2 parame-
ters of errors, namely the error in the forward path, Q,
which informs the legitimate parties of Eve’s gain, thus
the rate for PA, and the error in the backward path, QAB
which tells of the cost in bits for error correction pur-
poses. There is no reason a priori to imagine that these
2 this is relatively easy to derive for any state on the equator of
the Poincare sphere and also given in the Methods section.
4two parameters are linked by some straightforward math-
ematical relationship (even if we assume both channels
as depolarising). Hence, the cases of ‘correlated chan-
nels’ or ‘independent channels’ as studied in [22] are re-
ally specific models which may (or not) be true in the
case of an actual implementation. A ‘security threshold’
can only be determined after both Q and QAB are deter-
mined. More importantly, the notion of security thresh-
old, which is commonly understood as a point denoting
the value for error in the channel such that beyond it no
secure key can be extracted must give way to the idea of
curves in a plane defined by Q and QAB separating re-
gions where key extraction is possible and otherwise. We
define hence, a security threshold as the area for region
of the said plane where secret key extraction is possible;
i.e. where the secret key rate is greater than zero (we
take the maximum values for Q and QAB for the total
region as where Eve’s information gain is maximum and
Alice-Bob’s mutual information is minimal respectively).
Secret key rates can be written as 1− IE − h(QAB) [23].
In order to have an idea of the protocol’s merit, we
compare it to the earlier ‘orthogonal’ protocol of [7], (in
some literature referred to as LM05)3. We calculate and
compare the secure key rates per raw key bit for varying
values of both Q and QAB . Within the depolarising chan-
nel framework, Eve’s gain for LM05 is given as h(1−2Q)
[19, 20].
The contour plot on the left, FIG. 1(a) represents the
current protocol while FIG. 1(b) is for LM05. The insets
shows Eve’s gain for each protocol respectively. The fig-
ures clearly demonstrate how utilising these nonorthog-
onal transformations suppresses Eve’s information, quite
drastically in fact, as we observe the region (defined by
Q and QAB) for extractable secure key is greatest for the
current protocol. This is mainly due to the lesser gain
by an eavesdropper for the current protocol (insets). A
direct numerical integration (using a mathematical soft-
ware) gives the security thresholds for the current pro-
tocol and LM05 as ≈ 0.037 and ≈ 0.017 respectively. It
is perhaps instructive to note that had we compared ab-
solute secure key rates, then a factor of 1/4 would be
multiplied to the key rate for the current protocol rela-
tive to that of LM05; this however does not change the
security thresholds.
We now return to the issue of the inaccessibility of the
value Q. As noted in [13], protocols like LM05 using or-
thogonal unitary transformation requires a CM. In prin-
ciple, given the fact that Alice’s encoding in the current
protocol cannot be ascertained perfectly by Eve, even for
a maximal attack (Q = 0.25) the CM is, to a certain ex-
tent obsolete. A naive way of putting this would be to say
3 we consider this as fair comparison given the two has essentially
identical topologies as well number of states and transformations
used
that a key can still be distilled, without knowing Q pro-
vided the error in Bob’s (raw) key is less than a certain
QAB while assuming Eve has maximal information inde-
pendent of errors in the raw key. We can simply calculate
QAB as follows: Alice and Bob can have a positive key
rate provided h(QAB) < 1 − max (IE), i.e. QAB ≈ 7%.
Thus in some sense, having a semblance of CM for the
current protocol would only provide for a better key rate
as Eve’s information gain can be ascertained properly.
However, as we shall see shortly, practical considera-
tions may delegate the estimation of Q to a more critical
role, especially given possible physical realisations with
the use of polarisation of photons as qubits and wave-
plates for transformations.
III. A PRACTICAL PROTOCOL
Let us consider a practical implementation of the
protocol using the polarisation degree of photons as
qubits. Realistic implementations of unitary transfor-
mations process pulses of photons independently of the
actual number of photons. This of course exposes the
protocol to a Quantum Man in the Middle attack where
Eve could hijack Bob’s photon en route and estimate Al-
ice’s transformations perfectly using a bright pulse be-
fore encoding Bob’s photon accordingly to be submitted
to him. The solution to this problem is the use of CM.
The CM itself should of course involve a finite number
of bases, say n, used for preparations and measurements;
lest Alice and Bob would have a probability of approach-
ing zero to agree a basis on in CM, limn→∞1/n = 0.
We can thus imagine adding a step such that with
probability c, Alice executes a CM where she would mea-
sure the incoming qubit in a basis selected from n pre-
agreed bases. Bob should then include these n bases in
his EM so that with probability c/n, a CM is success-
ful and Alice and Bob may estimate errors in the for-
ward path.4 This immediately provides Alice and Bob
with a means to access Q and thus estimate Eve’s in-
formation gain and the security analysis of the previous
section holds.5 For practical purposes, we set n = 2,
corresponding to the conventional CM where the bases
used are mutually unbiased. For simplicity, we further
set Bob’s number of basis in EM to be 2 as well and
correspond to the same bases for CM.
4 originally, some two-way protocols include an error check in the
backward path as well. However, given that the security analysis
does not provide for a parameter checking on the backward path,
we do not consider such a check here.
5 we do not however consider imperfections to the extent of having
multiphoton pulses nor do we consider losses in channels
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FIG. 1: Comparison of secret key rate (per bit) as contour plots, denoting only the positive key rate regions and Eve’s information
gain (insets) for the current protocol (a) against LM05 (b). The insets show that the maximal amount of information Eve can
gain (for maximal disturbance) in LM05 is 1 (complete) while only about 0.6 for the current protocol.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL PROOF OF CONCEPT
In the following we report on an experimental im-
plementation of the practical protocol described above
where Bob uses polarisation of photons derived from only
2 MUBs, namely the X (diagonal) basis and the Z (recti-
linear) basis for his preparations and measurements. The
setup is basically a proof of principle with modest appa-
ratus utilising polarised photons from attenuated laser
pulses as qubits and half wave plates for the encoding
process. These should be rather conventional; for exam-
ple, the former is quite standard in QKD experiments or
the latter for orthogonal/ nonorthogonal unitary imple-
mentation in [8, 16]. While we do simulate the presence
of Eve by introducing noise on the forward and backward
paths (‘artificial depolarisation’ akin to that in [8]), it is
important to stress that this is not meant to be a full
scale secure implementation. For example, rather than
have Bob randomly select between bases for his qubits,
we allow the protocol to be executed with Bob choosing
one bases for a certain number of runs and another for
the other runs; as is the case for Alice’s encoding. We
also do not execute classical aspect of a QKD protocol
such as authenticating the users (Alice and Bob), error
correction of Alice-Bob’s strings and privacy amplifica-
tion.
Figure 2 shows the schematic of the experimental setup
which comprises of three main parts; namely Bob’s, Eve’s
and Alice’s sites. Bob’s site consists of a photon state
preparation setup and Measurement Device (described in
Methods) to analyse incoming photons in the backward
path, whereas Alice’s is composed of an Encoder (to be
used in EM) and a Measurement Device (to be used in
CM).
At Bob’s site, photon states were generated by a
strongly attenuated laser and the polarisation of the pho-
tons can be set by using a zero-order half-wave plate.
The polarised photon is then transmitted to Alice site
via free-space (forward-path).
Alice passively switches between CM and EM using a
50/50 beam splitter (BS). In CM, Alice would measure
the incoming photon directly in the forward-path using a
Measurement Device (described in the Methods section)
with the waveplate (H8). In the experiment, for the sake
of simplicity, we always set Alice’s measurement bases
to be equal to Bob’s preparation bases. Obviously a full
fledged implementation would require Alice to measure
in either the rectilinear or diagonal bases randomly where
half would eventually be discarded.
In the EM mode, Alice would need to realise the I and
Ry(−pi/2) operators. A pair of half wave plates (H6,7)
is used for the purpose before forwarding the qubit to
a mirror, thus returning it to Bob via free space in the
backward path.
The incoming polarisation encoded photons from Al-
ice are finally analysed at Bob’s site using a Measurement
Device (refer to Methods) with the zero-order half wave-
plate (H9) set in either the same bases the qubits were
6FIG. 2: Sketch of the experimental setup. Pi are Polarising Beamsplitters, Di are detectors (avalanched photodiode modules)
and Hi are Half waveplates (Hi,j refers to Hi and Hj). GT is a Glan-Thomson polariser, BS a beamsplitter and NDF are
neutral density filters.
originally prepared or one rotated to the other basis.
The existence of the eavesdropper in the forward path
and backward path is simulated by introducing noise in
the communication system. This is done by virtue of
‘artificial depolarisation’ channels in the forward as well
as backward paths. It is important to note that we do
not require the errors in the forward path to be equal to
that in the backward nor do we require the errors in EM
to be trivially related to that in CM; thus discarding the
usual models of noise considered for two-way QKDs.
We use two independent personal computers equipped
with PCIe field-programmable gate array card (FPGA;
National Instruments PCIe-7853) to control and synchro-
nise all active equipment in the experiment as well as for
data acquisition purposes.
A. Experimental Results
Data were collected for each ‘noise’ setting; thus for
each setting, we would have a pair of (average) errors,
i.e. one from CM and the other from EM. In the case for
EM, choosing only data which in principle would provide
Bob with conclusive inference of Alice’s encodings, we
consider which of the cases tally with the actual encoding
used by Alice and which do not (errors). Averaging the
results over all states (by Bob) and encoding (by Alice)
used, we arrive at an averaged error rate for the EM.
Data providing error rates for CM is quite straightfor-
ward as we only compare the state sent by Bob to that
measured in CM. As argued earlier, that one may not
know a priori the relationship between the errors in CM
and EM (assuming there is one), we do not presume plot-
ting the more conventional ‘information curves’ for Eve’s
gain (which is a function of Q) and Alice-Bob’s (which is
a function of QAB). Instead, points are plotted based on
these error rates as QAB versus Q as in FIG. 3. We in-
clude the contour lines of the previous FIG. 1 to exhibit
which of the points fall below the security threshold and
which beyond. The values accompanying the points are
just the value for the corresponding (in theory) secret key
rates calculated using the secret key rate formula.
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FIG. 3: The red points are derived from the experiment. The
numbers accompanying each point represent “secure key rate”
calculated using the key rate formula for the current proto-
col. The contour curves are based on earlier calculations as
in FIG.1. The red curve represents the boundary between
the region for distillable key (below) and non-distillable key
(above).
While the points that occupy the secure region in the
7figure (positive secret key rate) reflect a very small sam-
ple of points that can, in principle be achieved experi-
mentally, we believe that these results already point out
to the feasible and practical picture of our protocol.
V. CONCLUSIONS
Bidirectional or two way QKD has certainly been a topic
of interest for more than a decade now, ranging from en-
tanglement based protocols, nonentangled versions and
even continuous variables framework [24]. These pro-
tocols essentially have a common topology; where one
party sends quantum states to another who would en-
code with a transformation before sending it back to the
sender for his decoding measurement. Building on this,
we demonstrate the simplest way forward for such proto-
cols to actually embody the essence of creating an ambi-
guity for Eve to determine the encoding rather than rely
strictly on the use of nonorthogonal states as informa-
tion carriers to suppress her information gain. We thus
proposed and analysed in this work, a novel bidirectional
QKD protocol making use of only two nonorthogonal uni-
tary transformations selected from two different MUUBs
for encoding purposes along a rather different decoding
procedure, akin to the SARG protocol [18]. Theoreti-
cal analysis based on collective attacks, coupled with a
more relevant definition for security threshold has pro-
vided with a promising picture for the protocol’s security
compared to its predecessor.
We have also executed an experimental setup for a
proof of concept of the protocol using weak photon pulses
traversing artificial depolarising channels between the le-
gitimate parties with a pair of half wave plates for the
encoding transformation. While we do not commit to
actually distilling a secret key, we have demonstrated
its feasibility given a very modest setup. A full scale
protocol with actual secret key extraction is hence very
possible given some addendum to the setup to include
randomisation of Bob’s choice for preparation and mea-
surement, Alice’s choice for encoding as well as a proper
execution of error correction and privacy amplification
protocols.
Given its promising security, we hope that the future
would see more realistic issues be addressed; a quick ex-
ample would be the issue of multiphoton pulses coupled
with channel losses and how the current protocol would
perform given such imperfections. On a more fundamen-
tal note, we believe, this work should engender further
interest, especially regarding the role of indistinguish-
able unitary transformations and even MUUBs within
the context of quantum cryptography and quantum in-
formation as a whole.
VI. METHODS
In the following, we provide some details on the
method we used in the theoretical calculations, mainly
ascertaining the eigenvalues for the state ρBE as well as
certain detailed aspects of the experimental setup.
A. Theoretical calculation for Eve’s information
We show in this section how one calculates the eigen-
values for the density operator ρBE . This is done, fol-
lowing [20] by calculating the eigenvalues of its Gramm
matrix representation. We start by noting the definition
for the Gramm matrix representation [21] for an ensem-
ble of pure states {|φi〉, ..., |φn〉, pi, ..., pn}, a state given
as
∑n
i |φi〉〈φi| can be represented by a Gram matrix G
with the elements Gij =
√
pipj〈φi|φj〉. Thus, to write
out the Gramm matrix GBE , for ρBE , we first write out
all the possible (pure) states for Bob and Eve (after Al-
ice’s encoding) as
|Ψ0〉 = |0〉|E00〉+ |1〉|E01〉, (12)
|Ψ1〉 = |0〉|E10〉+ |1〉|E11〉,
|Ψ2〉 = REy |Ψ0〉, |Ψ3〉 = REy |Ψ1〉,
and the Gramm matrix for the mixture
∑
i |Ψi〉〈Ψi|/4,
(each of the pure state |Ψi〉 is equiprobable) is given by
1 0 1/
√
2 α/
√
2
0 1 −α/√2 1/√2
1/
√
2 −α/√2 1 0
α/
√
2 1/
√
2 0 1

with α = (F cosx − Q cos y). The eigenvalues can then
be easily calculated to be
λ± =
1
8
(2±
√
2(F cosx−Q cos y)2 + 2). (13)
and hence
S(ρBE) = −2(λ+ log2 λ+ + λ− log2 λ−). (14)
The above calculation can be repeated with Bob using
the bases defined by the following states
|0q〉 = cos (θ/2)|0〉+ sin (θ/2)|1〉, (15)
|1q〉 = sin (θ/2)|0〉 − cos (θ/2)|1〉
and we can write out the states of Bob and Eve subse-
quent to Alice’s encoding as
|Ψq0〉 = |0q〉|Eq00〉+ |1q〉|Eq01〉, (16)
|Ψq1〉 = |0q〉|Eq10〉+ |1q〉|Eq11〉,
|Ψq2〉 = REy |Ψq0〉, |Ψq3〉 = REy |Ψq1〉
8where Eve’s ancillary states in the above equation are
given by
|Eq00〉 = C1|E00〉+ C2|E01〉+ C2|E10〉+ C3|E11〉 (17)
|Eq01〉 = C2|E00〉 − C1|E01〉+ C3|E10〉 − C2|E11〉
|Eq10〉 = C2|E00〉+ C3|E01〉 − C1|E10〉 − C2|E11〉
|Eq11〉 = C3|E00〉 − C2|E01〉 − C2|E10〉+ C1|E11〉
with C1 = cos2 (θ/2), C2 = cos (θ/2) sin (θ/2) and C3 =
sin2 (θ/2). This results in another Gramm matrix with
equal eigenvalues. Thus Eve’s information remains the
same irrespective of Bob’s choice of states. Further to
that, setting 〈E00|E00〉 = 〈Eq00|Eq00〉 = F gives
F =
(1 + cos y)
2 + (cos y − cosx) (18)
This is just a rederiving of the same in [2].
B. Experiment
Photon State Preparation Polarised photon states
were generated by a strongly attenuated pulsed laser
diode (Coherent, OBIS 785 LX) using variable neutral
density filters (NDF). The use of variable NDF is
to allow for the preparation of photon states with a
certain averaged number per pulse, µ. A Glan-Thomson
polariser (GT), with an extinction ratio of 100000:1, was
inserted after the attenuator to ensure linearly polarised
photon states. A zero-order half-wave plate (H1) after
GT prepares particular polarised states; the polarisation
states|z+〉, |z−〉, and |x−〉, |x+〉 were prepared by set-
ting the polariser angles to ϕ = 0, ϕ = pi/4, ϕ = −pi/8,
and ϕ = pi/8 with respect to z-axis, respectively. The
density of photon µ was set to ≈ 0.15 photon/pulse,
measured just after the half-wave plate (H1).
Measurement Device The measurement device is
made up of a set of zero-order half waveplate (H8
for Alice and H9 for Bob), a polarizing beam splitter
(P1 for Alice and P2 for Bob) and two avalanched
photodiode modules (APD) (D1 and D2 for Alice
and D3 and D4 for Bob) with the quantum efficiency
of about 70% at a wavelength of 785nm. Incoming
photons are collected into two multimode fibers using
objective lenses (Newport M-10X, focal length 16.5mm,
NA=0.25) through a pair of interference filters centered
at 785nm with a bandwidth of 10nm (used to reduce
background light) to eventually be detected by the APDs.
Alice’s Encoder Alice’s encoding operation is realized
by the use of a couple of half wave plates (H6,7, for
angles ϕ6, ϕ7 with respect to the z axis) which rotates
any state on the equator of the Poincare sphere by an
angle ϕ6 + ϕ7. The passive, I operation was realized by
setting the angles of the half wave plates H6,7 are to be
ϕ6 = ϕ7 = 0 radiant, while the flipping of polarization
states between the mutually orthonormal Z and X
bases, Ry(−pi/2) is realised by setting the angles of H6,7
to be ϕ6 = pi/8 radian, and ϕ7 = pi/4 radian.
Artificial Depolarisation Artificial depolarisation is
induced by simply inserting a pair of half-wave plates
in the forward path (H2,3) and another in the backward
path (H4,5). This has the effect (in each path) to rotate
the state sent by Bob by a certain angle, thus resulting
in a probability of an erroneous detection in the CM as
well as EM. Varying levels of ‘depolarisation’, or more
precisely, erroneous detection in each path can be inde-
pendently introduced by rotating the angles half-wave
plates accordingly. It is worth noting that this artifi-
cial method while aimed at creating a symmetric error
for the two bases used by Bob in CM, would create an
asymmetry in the errors caused for different encodings
used by Alice. However, we shall only be interested in
the averaged error values for this experiment.
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